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DEBATE

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STOP-AND-FRISK
IN NEW YORK CITY

Stop-and-frisk, a crime prevention tactic that allows a police oﬃcer to
stop a person based on “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity and frisk
based on reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous, has
been a contentious police practice since ﬁrst approved by the Supreme
Court in 1968. In Floyd v. City of New York, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled that New York City’s stop-and-frisk
practices violate both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Professors
David Rudovsky and Lawrence Rosenthal debate the constitutionality of
stop-and-frisk in New York City in light of Floyd and Judge Shira A.
Scheindlin’s controversial removal from the case. Professor Rudovsky
argues that Floyd shows the important role of data and statistical analysis in
assessing the constitutionality of stop-and-frisk procedures. He contends
that empirical evidence regarding both the factors for and outcomes of stops
and frisks in New York demonstrates that either the legal standard is too
permissive or police-stop documentation is not truthful. In response,
Professor Rosenthal argues that Judge Scheindlin erred in failing to
consider evidence of stop-and-frisk’s eﬃcacy—evidence indicating that the
NYPD’s stops are based on reasonable suspicion, a standard considerably
less demanding than “preponderance of the evidence.” Additionally,
Rosenthal argues that Judge Scheindlin should have considered diﬀerential
oﬀending by race or other potentially nondiscriminatory explanations for
the higher stop rates of minorities.

(117)
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O PENING STATEMENT
Stop-and-Frisk: The Power of Data and the Decision in
Floyd v. City of New York
D AVID R UDOVSKY†
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court ruled that a person could be seized
by the police based on a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was involved
in serious criminal conduct, and further, if there were also reasonable
suspicion that the person stopped was “armed and dangerous,” the oﬃcer
could frisk the suspect for the oﬃcer’s protection. See 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30
(1968). Over the past forty-ﬁve years, the power of police to stop and frisk
has greatly expanded and now encompasses all suspected criminal activity,
no matter how trivial, and under circumstances where the conduct observed
may be fully consistent with innocence. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002). Given the extremely broad grounds for stopand-frisk, the large numbers of persons subjected to these stops, the wide
discretion of police departments to decide where to deploy oﬃcers and
whom to stop and frisk, and the disproportionate number of minorities
subjected to these investigative detentions, it is no surprise that the Terry
doctrine continues to be highly controversial as a question of constitutional
law and as an aspect of the broader issue of eﬀective and fair policing.
In Floyd v. City of New York, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ruled that New
York City’s stop-and-frisk practices violate the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at *70-75
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). The court reached these conclusions on a full
evidentiary record that included a statistical analysis of over 4.4 million
stops in New York City from January 2004 to June 2012. Id. at *1. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the judgment and remedial
order and, in a controversial ruling, removed Judge Scheindlin from the case
on grounds that her acceptance of the case as “related” to a previous case over
which she presided, as well as her interviews with the press, created an
appearance of impropriety. In re Reassignment of Cases: Floyd v. City of
† David Rudovsky is a Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a
founding partner of Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg LLP. Professor Rudovsky served as
counsel in Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), discussed infra.
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New York, No. 13-3088, 2013 WL 5998139, at *1-8 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2013). In
this Opening Statement, I contend that Judge Scheindlin’s factual findings
and legal analysis are correct. I start with a brief overview of the Terry
doctrine, follow with a discussion of Floyd and related litigation in Philadelphia,
and then provide a critique of both the doctrinal and policing aspects of
investigative detentions.
The Supreme Court’s deﬁnition of the Terry “reasonable suspicion”
standard has been largely a function of the Justices’ subjective assessments
as to whether the conduct at issue is predictive of criminal conduct. The
Court has repeatedly stated that it would apply “commonsense” judgments
and permit oﬃcers to make reasonable inferences from a suspect’s behavior
in determining whether there were legal grounds for a stop-and-frisk. See,
e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). The Court has not
required police or prosecutors to demonstrate by empirical data that the
characteristics relied upon—for example, that the suspect was acting
suspiciously, had ﬂed from police, had bulges in his pockets, or was engaged
in “furtive movements”—are actually predictive of criminal conduct. Thus,
in Wardlow, the Court permitted a stop-and-frisk where the suspect ﬂed
from police in a high crime area. Id. at 124-25. There was no other proof of
any criminal conduct and the Court recognized that many persons, particularly in minority neighborhoods, might not want to engage with the police
and might ﬂee, though perfectly innocent. Id. at 125. The Court simply
assumed that persons who avoided the police in high crime areas could
reasonably be suspected to be involved in criminal conduct. But studies
have shown that there is no signiﬁcant correlation between this conduct and
criminal activity. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt,
Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 90 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 733, 790 (2000).
As a related matter, the Supreme Court’s deﬁnition of “reasonable suspicion” permits consideration of behavior that is entirely innocent. See
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75. Indeed, stops and frisks have often been justiﬁed
on vague and subjective grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d
1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1986) (ﬁnding that police possessed reasonable suspicion
where an arriving airline passenger scanned the passenger area, walked at a
fast pace through the terminal, clutched his carry-on luggage, became
nervous when police advised him they were investigating drug traﬃcking, and
provided inconsistent statements about needing to visit his sick grandmother).
In addition, the lack of empirical data (a direct result of the failure of
most police departments to maintain stop-and-frisk data) has compromised
the constitutional assessment of stop-and-frisk practices. We do not know
what grounds for stops tend to reveal criminal conduct, including possession
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of weapons. Nor do we have data from most police departments regarding
racial disparities in stops or even the actual number of stops and frisks. As a
result, the legal doctrine, police procedures, and community responses to
this pervasive practice have been based on conjecture and speculation.
Further, case-by-case adjudications are made in a vacuum as courts do not
have access to relevant information regarding the universe of stops and
frisks in each jurisdiction.
Finally, the stop-and-frisk doctrine has developed primarily as a function of the exclusionary rule, which means that the cases in which courts
adjudicate the issue are those where contraband or other evidence of
criminal conduct was uncovered in the investigative detention. In this
context, signiﬁcant forces, including police perjury and judicial reluctance to
suppress evidence, can distort the fact-ﬁnding process and legal analysis.
In New York City, stop-and-frisk practices have generated strong debate
on the wisdom and legality of these procedures. This debate came to a head
in Floyd v. City of New York. From January 2004 through June 2012, the New
York City Police Department made 4.4 million pedestrian stops, of which
over 80% were of African Americans or Latinos. Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at
*1. More than half of those stopped were also subjected to a frisk. The Floyd
court found the following facts:
•

The number of stops per year rose sharply from 314,000 in 2004 to a
high of 686,000 in 2011. Id. at *3. The 2011 ﬁgure represents approximately 8.3% of New York City’s 2011 population, estimated at 8.24 million persons. See POPULATION DIV., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING,
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSING ESTIMATES: NEW YORK CITY AND BOROUGHS (Sept. 2012), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/boro_demo_2011_acs.pdf.

•

52% of all stops were followed by a protective frisk for weapons; a
weapon was found in only 1.5% of these frisks. Floyd, 2013 WL
4046209, at *3.

•

8% of all stops led to a search into the stopped person’s clothing—
ostensibly because the oﬃcer felt an object during the frisk that he
either suspected to be a weapon or immediately perceived to be other
contraband. In 9% of these searches, the object was a weapon. 91% of
the time, it was not. In 86% of these searches, the object was not contraband. Id. at *4.

•

6% of all 4.4 million stops resulted in an arrest; 6% resulted in a summons. The remaining 88% resulted in no further law enforcement action. Id.
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•

In 83% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black or Hispanic; in 10%, the person was white. Id.

•

In 2010, New York City’s resident population was 23% black, 29% Hispanic, and 33% white. Id.

•

The oﬃcer used force in 23% of the stops of blacks, in 24% of the stops
of Hispanics, and in 17% of the stops of whites. Id.

•

Weapons were seized in 1.0% of the stops of blacks, in 1.1% of the stops
of Hispanics, and in 1.4% of the stops of whites. Id.

•

Contraband other than weapons was seized in 1.8% of the stops of
blacks, in 1.7% of the stops of Hispanics, and in 2.3% of the stops of
whites. Id.

•

In 2004, the oﬃcer failed to state a speciﬁc suspected crime in 1% of
stops. This ﬁgure rose to ��% by 2009. Id.

121

Plaintiﬀs’ expert, Dr. Jeﬀrey Fagan, conducted a review of forms prepared by oﬃcers after each stop and classiﬁed the stops as “apparently
justiﬁed,” “apparently unjustiﬁed,” or “ungeneralizable.” Id. at *17. Signiﬁcantly, this review accepted as true in every instance the information stated
by the police. Id. These indeﬁnite categories reﬂected a ﬂawed recording
system that consisted mainly of checkboxes of highly subjective factors
(e.g., “furtive movements,” “evasive response,” “suspicious bulge,” “high
crime area”), id. at *17-18, none of which provided a full textual statement of
the basis for a stop. The repetitive use of “high crime area” and “furtive
movements” as the basis for the stop led Dr. Fagan to conclude that oﬃcers
were employing a routinized script in asserting reasonable suspicion. Id. In
addition to the vague and patterned reasons for stops, the court noted that
some stops were not recorded, that 36% of the 2009 stop forms did not
identify a suspected crime, that “furtive movements” and “high crime area”
(which were each marked in over 40% of the stops) were “negatively
correlated” with a summons or arrest, and that only 12% of all stops resulted
in an arrest or summons. Id. at *13, *19. On this basis, the court concluded
that the number of stops without reasonable suspicion was signiﬁcantly
greater than the 200,000 impermissible stops identiﬁed by plaintiﬀs, id. at
*18-19, and that the City had a policy and custom of Fourth Amendment
violations. Id. at *70.
On the race discrimination claim, the court ﬁrst had to decide which of
the competing “benchmarks” proposed by the experts provided the best
statistical approach for measuring possible racial proﬁling. Id. at *19. Dr.
Fagan used population and reported crime as benchmarks for understanding
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the racial distribution of stops. Id. at *20. The City proposed a benchmark
consisting of the rates at which various races appear in suspect descriptions
from crime victims (“suspect race description data”). Id.
The court credited Dr. Fagan’s analysis and ruled that the City’s
benchmark was ﬂawed by the assumption that the racial distribution of
stopped pedestrians would resemble the racial distribution of the local
criminal population, even if “the people stopped [we]re not criminals.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). Given the fact that nearly 90% of all persons stopped
were not involved in criminal conduct and that only 13% were stopped
pursuant to a speciﬁc suspect description, a benchmark of persons actually
involved in criminal conduct was not reliable. Id. Crime suspect data may
serve as a reliable proxy for the pool of criminals exhibiting suspicious
behavior, but not for innocent persons, particularly where the “behavior”
descriptions are so vague and often consistent with innocence. It is important
to note that even where there are high levels of crime by race, very few
persons in the community are responsible. By the City’s logic, all minority
residents are properly suspect for the acts of these very few assailants. Cf.
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem
as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner of his beat as a high
crime area.”).
Dr. Fagan’s standards and regression analysis provided strong support
for a ﬁnding of race discrimination. More stops were made of blacks and
Hispanics, even when other relevant variables were held constant. Floyd,
2013 WL 4046209, at *23-24. Dr. Fagan cited the excess of race-correlated
stops beyond that which would be consistent with the local crime rate as
evidence of racially disparate treatment. Id. at *24. The analysis also
revealed that, regardless of the racial composition of a geographic area,
blacks and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped. Id. Once stopped,
blacks were 30% more likely than whites to be arrested (controlling for the
alleged crime), as opposed to receiving a summons. Id. And minorities were
9-14% more likely to be subjected to the use of force. Id. Most signiﬁcantly,
the hit rate for blacks, as measured by the issuance of a summons or an arrest,
was 8% lower than for white suspects. Id. This evidence demonstrates that
minorities were targeted for stops based on a lesser degree of suspicion.
Beyond the statistical evidence, the court found evidence of race discrimination through an examination of “institutional” practices, speciﬁcally
the deliberate indiﬀerence of the NYPD to patterns of race discrimination
in stop-and-frisk practices. Id. at *24-47, *74-75. These patterns were
recognized as early as 1999, when the New York Attorney General issued a
report on stop-and-frisk practices that documented unexplained racial

4-Part Debate Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/10/2013 9:30 AM

The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City

123

disparities in stops. Id. at *25 & n.200. Despite this knowledge, the NYPD
put great pressure on commanders and others in the chain of command
(down to patrol oﬃcers) to increase the number of stops (from ��,��� in
2002 to 686,000 in 2011), id. at *26-33, but failed to audit the stops for
possible racial discrimination. Id. at *38-39. And there was evidence that
oﬃcers were encouraged to make stops based on racial characteristics or
stereotypes—to target the “right people,” young blacks and Hispanics. Id. at
*72. The court determined that these factors were evidence of the NYPD’s
failure to adequately train, supervise, or discipline oﬃcers with respect to
racial proﬁling practices. Id. at *75.
The constitutional ﬂaws in the New York City program are not isolated
phenomena. In Philadelphia, from 2008 to 2009, stops increased by almost
20%, reaching an annual rate of over 253,000 for a population less than 1.6
million, thus exceeding the rate of pedestrian stops in New York City. See
Research & Planning Unit, Phila. Police Dep’t, Investigation of Person by
District ( June 7, 2011) (on ﬁle with author) (noting a total of 216,832 stops
in 2008 and 253,276 stops in 2009); see also P HILA . R ESEARCH INITIATIVE , P EW C HARITABLE T RUSTS , P HILADELPHIA : T HE S TATE OF
THE C ITY , A 2010 U PDATE 5 ﬁg. (2010) (estimating the 2009 Philadelphia
population at 1.55 million), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Philadelphia_Research_Initiative/
PEW_SOCupdate_FIN.pdf#page=5#page. In 2010, a class action lawsuit
was ﬁled against the City of Philadelphia, presenting the same Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims raised in Floyd. See Settlement Agreement,
Class Certiﬁcation, and Consent Decree at �, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia,
C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), available at http://web.law.
columbia.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/microsites/contract-economic-organization/
ﬁles/baileyagreement.pdf. Soon thereafter, the parties agreed to a consent
decree that required the City to conduct stops and frisks within constitutional limits; prohibited stops and frisks solely on the basis of “loitering,”
being in a “high crime . . . area,” “acting suspiciously,” or making “furtive
movements;” and prohibited the use of race as a basis for a stop except in cases
of suspect identifications by race. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Between 2009 and 2012, the number of stops in Philadelphia dropped
from 253,000 to 215,000 per year. See Plaintiﬀs’ Third Report to Court and
Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 4, Bailey, C.A. No. 10-5952, available at http://www.aclupa.org/download_ﬁle/view_inline/����/���. However,
the high rate of impermissible stops and frisks has persisted. A 2012 audit of
a random sample of 1850 stops revealed that 43-47% of all stops and frisks
were made without reasonable suspicion. Id. (A police department audit of
2013 stops showed a patrol unit rate of 37% improper stops. Audits &
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Inspections Div., Phila. Police Dep’t, 75-48A Comprehensive Audit: 2nd
Quarter 2013, at � (Sept. �, ����) (on ﬁle with author).) The hit rates in
2012 were even lower than in New York City. Contraband was recovered in
only twenty-nine stops (1.57% of all stops) and only three guns were seized
(0.16%). Id. at 9. Arrests occurred in only 5.29% of all stops. Id. at 10.
Floyd and Bailey show the important role of data and statistical analysis
in assessing Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment stop-and-frisk issues. With
respect to Fourth Amendment analysis, police forms provide comprehensive information from which one can determine on a systemic basis whether
stops are being conducted with the requisite reasonable suspicion. As we
can see from the New York and Philadelphia data, large numbers of these
stops facially violate Fourth Amendment standards.
With respect to frisks, the data are even more troubling. In New York
City, between 2004 and 2012, there was a 1.5% rate of recovery of a weapon
following a frisk, Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *3, while in Philadelphia the
rate was 1.1% after the consent decree went into eﬀect. Plaintiﬀs’ Third
Report to Court, supra, at 6-7. It must be remembered that frisks may only
be conducted where the oﬃcer has reasonable suspicion that the person
stopped is armed and dangerous. And while the courts have not quantiﬁed
the reasonable suspicion standard in terms of expected hit rates for contraband, these rates are well below any reasonable threshold. In other words, if
the police are truthfully reporting the basis for their stops, it is apparent
that the legal standard is entirely too permissive as it authorizes stops and
frisks on the basis of conduct that is not reliably predictive of criminality.
The courts’ rulings that actions such as being present in a high crime area,
engaging in furtive movements, avoiding police contact, or appearing
nervous when stopped reliably predict criminal conduct (or that a suspicious
bulge or evasive conduct points to possession of a weapon) are largely
unsupported by the data. Alternatively, to the degree that these factors are
in fact predictive of criminal conduct, the low hit rates raise serious questions about the truthfulness and accuracy of police-stop documentation.
The stop-and-frisk data also provide a reliable basis on which to determine whether racial disparities in stop-and-frisk practices are the result of
racial proﬁling. Claims of racial bias are virtually impossible to prove in a
motion to suppress—in fact, the Supreme Court has ruled that racially
discriminatory stops are not even the proper subject of Fourth Amendment
analysis, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)—or even in a
civil rights lawsuit for damages. As the Floyd opinion reﬂects, benchmarks
and sophisticated regression analysis can properly measure discriminatory
patterns. For example, statistical ﬁndings that whites subjected to a stopand-frisk are more likely to be carrying a weapon than blacks or Hispanics
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are probative of the fact that the threshold for stopping minorities is lower
than that for stopping whites. Indeed, there is a certain irony in the Police
Department’s criticism of the statistical evidence in Floyd, which was relied
upon by the court only after a rigorous Daubert challenge. See Floyd v. City
of New York, ��� F. Supp. �d ��� (S.D.N.Y. ����) (admitting plaintiﬀs’
expert’s opinions). For many years, police and prosecutors in New York and
elsewhere have relied on police “experts” to convict defendants based on
untested scientiﬁc theories (e.g., hair samples, shoeprints, bite marks, and
outdated arson analysis) that have been proven to be unreliable. See N AT ’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 145-150, 155-61, 17076 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdﬃles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.
A word on eﬃcacy. Judge Scheindlin precluded the City from presenting evidence to support its position that stop-and-frisk has played a signiﬁcant role in reducing crime in New York City. See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209,
at *1. The proposition that the stop-and-frisk practices in New York have
been successful in reducing crime is both factually questionable and ultimately legally irrelevant. The court made clear that the resolution of the
case was not an all-or-nothing proposition. The NYPD can continue to stop
and frisk in accordance with constitutional principles. Thus, the issue is not
whether stops and frisks generally reduce crime, but whether the unlawful
stops and frisks can be justiﬁed on the basis of crime control. And, on this
question, not only does the evidence show very low hit rates, but it also fails
to show any causative eﬀects. Accordingly, in the ﬁrst quarter of ����, there
was a 50% reduction in the number of stops in New York City (compared
with the ﬁrst quarter of ����), but violent crime rates have continued to
drop at rates similar to those of past years, when the stop rate was far
higher. See, e.g., Tamer El-Ghobashy & Michael Howard Saul, New York
Police Use of Stop-and-Frisk Drops, W ALL S T . J. (May 6, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873233725045784673615
07997492. Of course, this evidence does not prove that stops play no role in
crime control; rather, it demonstrates that the causal eﬀects of various
means of policing and related social and economic factors on crime reduction are not easily determined.
Equally important, as a legal matter, the fact that unrestrained police
practices (e.g., dispensing with the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment) would suppress crime does not mean that
in our constitutional system, such “eﬃcacy” can trump restrictions on
governmental police powers. Is the City contending that unconstitutional
stops are legitimate on the basis of the deterrent eﬀect they have on residents
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who, knowing that they may be stopped without reason or because of their
race, decide not to carry weapons or contraband on the streets?
Finally, those who criticize the Floyd ruling must come to terms with the
long-term failure of the NYPD to engage in self-regulation and internal
accountability with respect to its stop-and-frisk practices. For years, data
that showed that oﬃcers had been engaging in large numbers of stops that
violated the Fourth Amendment were ignored, and the “scripted” forms
supposedly supporting these stops were taken at face value. Claims of racial
bias and gratuitous insults and demeaning conduct during stops were also
brushed aside, under the mantra that such practices were necessary to
eﬀective policing and reduction of crime. Indeed, the expert reports and
other evidence in Floyd provided no information not already known to the
NYPD. Courts are hesitant to intervene in policing on a systemic level, but
in this case, the deliberate indiﬀerence by the NYPD made judicial intervention necessary and proper.
Floyd reached the right result for the right reasons. Stops without legal
justiﬁcation are unconstitutional and have a counterproductive eﬀect by
reducing the trust necessary for community policing. And worse, if such
violations are also racially disproportionate, the injuries cut even deeper.
Pro-active, “hot spot,” and community policing can continue to play a role
in ensuring public safety. Nothing in Floyd prevents the police from stopping persons based on adequate factual grounds, as long as the practice is
not tainted by racial bias. Indeed, reform of these practices can establish the
foundation for fairer and more eﬀective community-based policing. These
reforms are possible through court-ordered remedies, but only if police
departments accept the basic constitutional tenets and hold oﬃcers and
supervisors accountable for systemic transgressions.
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R EBUTTAL
One-Eyed Floyd
L AWRENCE R OSENTHAL‡
Perhaps the most curious thing about Judge Scheindlin’s decision condemning the New York City Police Department’s program of stop-and-frisk
is how it insists on viewing stop-and-frisk in a relentlessly monocular fashion.
1. There is irony in Judge Scheindlin’s ﬁnding that the NYPD’s use of
stop-and-frisk amounts to a policy of unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. This tactic, branded as “unreasonable”
by Judge Scheindlin, actually seems to work.
Homicide in New York City rose from a rate of 4.7 per 100,000 population in 1960 to a 1991 peak of 31.0, in waves that roughly corresponded to
drug epidemics, with the increase concentrated in ﬁrearms-related homicides. See Jeﬀrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson & Garth Davies, Social
Contagion of Violence, in T HE C AMBRIDGE H ANDBOOK OF V IOLENT
B EHAVIOR AND A GGRESSION 688, 694-���, ��� ﬁg.��.� (Daniel J.
Flannery et al. eds., 2007). In 1991, the NYPD adopted a new community
policing model that emphasized foot patrols and combating low-level
disorder. See C IVIL R IGHTS B UREAU , N.Y. S TATE O FFICE OF THE
A TTORNEY G EN ., T HE N EW Y ORK C ITY P OLICE D EPARTMENT ’S
“S TOP AND F RISK ” P RACTICES: A R EPORT TO THE P EOPLE OF THE
S TATE OF N EW Y ORK FROM THE O FFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
47-52 (1999), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/ﬁles/pdfs/
bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk.pdf. Three years later, after the appointment
of a new police commissioner, the department began to place greater
emphasis on aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics for minor infractions, adopted
a system of statistical analysis that targeted enforcement at “hot spots” of crime,
and imposed greater managerial accountability. See id. at 52-56 & 53 n.32.
Between 1991 and 2009, New York experienced the broadest and deepest
decline in violent crime of any major American city. See F RANKLIN E.
Z IMRING , T HE C ITY THAT B ECAME S AFE : N EW Y ORK ’S L ESSONS
FOR U RBAN C RIME AND ITS C ONTROL 3-27 (2012). By 2012, New York’s
homicide victimization rate dropped to 5.05 per 100,000 population. See
‡

Professor of Law, Chapman University Fowler School of Law.
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FBI, C RIME IN THE U NITED S TATES 2012, at tbl.8 (2013), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/tables/8tabledatadecpdf/table-8-state-cuts/table_�_oﬀenses_known_to_
law_enforcement_by_new_york_by_city_2012.xls (showing 419 incidents of
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter out of a population of 8.3 million).
Space does not permit a complete examination of the causes of New York’s
crime drop. Elsewhere, I have reviewed the evidence and demonstrated that
there is a substantial case to be made that New York’s stop-and-frisk tactics
deserve considerable credit. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 T EX T ECH . L. R EV . 299,
320-30 (2010). Two additional studies by eminent criminologists have
provided additional evidence supporting this conclusion. See Z IMRING ,
supra, at 131-44; David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & Brian A. Lawton,
Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New York City Crime
Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength? The Case of Stop, Question
and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, J UST. Q. 11-18 (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418825.2012.754920#preview.
The superiority of proactive policing over reactive patrol should be unsurprising. As one criminologist put it, “Police on patrol cannot see enough
to intervene very often in the life of the community.” Mark Harrison
Moore, Problem-Solving and Community Policing, in 15 M ODERN P OLICING
99, 112 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992). Years ago, a police
executive made the same point to me when he told me that he had come to
regret that air conditioning had been installed in his department’s patrol
cars. In that insight can be found the case for stop-and-frisk. When undertaken with frequency and targeted at hot spots of crime, stop-and-frisk can
alter the perceptions of oﬀenders by making apparent the risks of carrying
drugs or guns in public. Reactive patrol, by contrast, encourages criminals
to intimidate the community so that they do not call police for help. When
drugs and guns are driven oﬀ the streetscape, the risks of violent confrontation decrease; community decline driven by open and notorious criminality
can be reversed. Indeed, aggressive patrol focused at statistical “hot spots”
of crime is one of the few crime control policies that has generated fairly
consistent evidence of its eﬃcacy. See, e.g., N AT ’L R ESEARCH C OUNCIL
OF THE N AT ’ L A CADS ., F IREARMS AND V IOLENCE : A C RITICAL
R EVIEW 230-35 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005); Cody W. Telep &
David Weisburd, What Is Known About the Eﬀectiveness of Police Practices in
Reducing Crime and Disorder?, 15 P OLICE Q. 331, 333-36, 340-41 (2012).
Like all debates about policing and crime, there are a myriad of factors
at work, and rarely can causal statements be made with complete conﬁdence. Yet, if there is any kind of serious case to be made for stop-and-frisk’s
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ability to drive down crime, surely the judiciary ought to pause before
tampering with tactics that may well save lives.
Judge Scheindlin, however, refused to cast her eye to questions of eﬃcacy, believing instead that her “mandate [wa]s solely to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its eﬀectiveness as a law enforcement tool.”
Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). Yet, in the seminal case blessing stop-and-frisk
as an investigative tool, the Supreme Court concluded that “there is ‘no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (alterations in original)
(quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)). To strike this
balance, a court must consider the “general interest . . . of eﬀective crime
prevention and detection,” an “interest which underlies the recognition that
a police oﬃcer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id. at
22. Judge Scheindlin, however, refused to consider this interest in “eﬀective
crime prevention.” To be sure, none of this means that the Fourth Amendment tolerates unconstrained stop-and-frisk merely because it reduces
crime. But evidence of the eﬃcacy of stop-and-frisk oﬀers at least some
indication that the NYPD’s stops are based on reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.
2. There is irony as well in Judge Scheindlin’s conclusion that stop-andfrisk amounts to discrimination against minorities, the chief beneﬁciary of
stop-and-frisk. Yet, this reality also remained unseen by Judge Scheindlin.
If the NYPD targets minorities, it is not alone; New York’s criminals do the
same. At the peak of New York’s crime wave in 1991, the homicide victimization rate in New York was 58 per 100,000 for blacks, 44 for Hispanics, and
8 for whites. A NDREW K ARMEN , N EW Y ORK M URDER M YSTERY: T HE
T RUE S TORY B EHIND THE C RIME C RASH OF THE 1990 S �� ﬁg.�.�
(2000). By 2007, the black homicide victimization rate had declined by more
than 42 per 100,000 to 15.9, and the Hispanic rate by more than 39 to 4.9,
while the white rate declined by less than 7 per 100,000, reaching 1.55. See
Z IMRING , supra, at �� ﬁg.�.�. Accordingly, the decline in homicide victimization rates for blacks and Hispanics far exceeded that experienced by
whites. Still, the racial skew in homicide victimization continues.
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The NYPD reported the following victimization statistics for 2012:
Murder and NonNegligent Homicide

Shootings

New York City
Population

Black

60.1%

74.1%

22.8%

Hispanic

26.7%

22.2%

28.8%

White

8.7%

2.8%

33.1%

Asian/

4.2%

0.8%

12.7%

Pac. Isl.

R AYMOND W. K ELLY , N.Y.C. P OLICE D EP’T , C RIME AND
MENT A CTIVITY IN N EW Y ORK C ITY 1, 11, B-1 (2013),

E NFORCEavailable at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/2012
_year_end_enforcement_report.pdf. When a federal judge sets out to
remake local policing policy while indiﬀerent to the eﬃcacy of those
policies she brands unconstitutional, it is the lives of minorities that are
placed at greatest risk.
3. Judge Scheindlin found that Fourth Amendment violations involving
stop-and-frisk occurred so frequently in New York that they amounted to
both a custom with the force of law and a practice to which policymakers
were deliberately indiﬀerent. Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *70-72. Yet, she
also acknowledged that about 6% of all stops resulted in an arrest and
another 6% resulted in a summons. Id. at *4. The Fourth Amendment
reasonable suspicion standard “falls considerably short of satisfying a
preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 274 (2002). It also “accepts the risk that oﬃcers may stop innocent
people.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000). In this context, a 12%
hit rate does not look so bad. It looks even better when one considers that
even an apparently unsuccessful stop-and-frisk can create important beneﬁts
by deterring potential oﬀenders and cooling oﬀ criminogenic hot spots.
Although the Floyd plaintiﬀs produced evidence relating to nineteen
speciﬁc stops, ���� WL �������, at *�, such a small sample proves very
little about New York City’s policies. With hundreds of thousands of stops
at issue, the facts of nineteen discrete incidents cherry-picked by the
plaintiﬀs’ lawyers are statistically meaningless. More signiﬁcant is the
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analysis of the plaintiﬀs’ expert. Relying on data from the UF-250 forms that
oﬃcers must complete after stops, he estimated that the rate of “apparently
unjustiﬁed” stops was about 6%. Id. at *16-17. To my eye, this does not look
like evidence of a police department that has eﬀectively decreed that
noncompliance with the law is its oﬃcial policy, or that is deliberately
indiﬀerent to constitutional requirements. One study of police practices in a
mid-sized American city found that 46% of pat-down searches observed by
researchers were unconstitutional. See Jon B. Gould & Stephen D.
Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 C RIMINOLOGY & P UB. P OL ’Y 315, 333 (2004). I have my doubts
about the soundness of that conclusion, see Rosenthal, supra, at 330 n.210,
but by that standard, the NYPD is doing pretty well.
Judge Scheindlin, however, discounted the signiﬁcance of the 12% hit
rate and the estimated �% unjustiﬁed stop rate with a cascade of speculation. She opined that these calculations are unreliable because oﬃcers may
not always prepare a UF-250; UF-���s reﬂect only the oﬃcer’s version of a
stop and do not contain enough information to ascertain its lawfulness;
many of the “stop factors” listed on the UF-250 form are unreliable indicators of reasonable suspicion; over time, oﬃcers learned to check oﬀ a greater
number of factors in order to justify a search; and because the plaintiﬀs’
expert was overly conservative in his assumption that certain ambiguous
factors justiﬁed stops. See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *16-19. Still, it is
striking that no expert was willing to opine that the UF-250 database could
properly support a ﬁnding of a rate of unjustiﬁed stops exceeding �%; it was
the nonexpert in black robes who drew that conclusion.
Indeed, Judge Scheindlin’s discussion of the ﬂaws in the UF-250 data,
viewed from a diﬀerent angle, suggests that there was no proper support for
her ﬁndings. We cannot tell whether the data reﬂect the rate of unjustiﬁed
stops or simply the limitations of the UF-250 form. The factors listed on
the form may be imperfect, but they are all we have for statistical analysis;
and they are hardly irrelevant to the lawfulness of stop-and-frisk. Although
Judge Scheindlin deprecated presence in a “high crime area” and “furtive
movements” as justiﬁcations for a stop, id. at *17-19, the Supreme Court has
explained that both “nervous, evasive behavior” and “the fact that the stop
occurred in a ‘high crime area’” are relevant to assessing the lawfulness of a
stop. Wardlow, ��� U.S. at ��� (citations omitted). Thus, oﬃcers’ use of
these factors does not mean that a stop is unjustiﬁed; indeed, their use of
these factors explains why the plaintiﬀs’ expert was unable to characterize
stops as unjustiﬁed when these factors were present in combination with
others. Similarly, one can only speculate whether evolving trends in oﬃcers’
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use of the UF-��� form reﬂect misconduct or, instead, an increasing
awareness of the need for care in documenting the justiﬁcation for stops.
This is not to say that all is well with stop-and-frisk in New York. The
number of stops per year increased from 314,000 in 2004 to 686,000 in 2011.
Floyd, ���� WL �������, at *�. It is hard to believe that oﬃcers’ keen
observations alone produced such an astonishing surge. Moreover, there is
ample evidence that supervisors pressured subordinates to increase stops.
Id. at *26-33. It may well be that as crime continued to decline in tandem
with increased stop-and-frisk, command staﬀ pushed the practice to the
point of diminishing returns. For example, stop-and-frisk may have spread
well beyond the hot spots where it is most likely to be justiﬁed—a conclusion supported by evidence of increasing stops in relatively low crime areas
where suspects seemed merely “out of place.” See Andrew Gelman, Jeﬀrey
Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop
and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. A M . S TAT .
A SS’N 813, 822 (2007). If this happened, however, it argues only for retaining stop-and-frisk’s original focus on high crime hot spots—certainly not for
condemning stop-and-frisk even when it is so targeted.
4. Judge Scheindlin also determined that the NYPD has “a policy of indirect racial proﬁling based on local criminal suspect data” and that the
NYPD and the City “have been deliberately indiﬀerent to the intentionally
discriminatory application of stop and frisk.” Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at
*72. She based these conclusions on evidence that blacks and Hispanics
were stopped at elevated rates when compared to a benchmark that considered local population and reported crime rates. Id. at *20, *23-24. But this is
again a rather one-dimensional way to view the data. Most obviously, it
overlooks the problem of diﬀerential oﬀending.
If minorities commit crimes at higher rates than nonminorities, then
even absent discrimination, one might expect them to be more frequently
subjected to stop-and-frisk tactics. For example, if a stop is properly based
on evidence reﬂecting a ��% probability that a suspect is engaged in unlawful activity, and the underlying oﬀending rate is �.�% for nonminorities and
5% for minorities, a nondiscriminatory stop-and-frisk regime could nevertheless produce a 12.5% nonminority stop rate and a 25% minority stop rate.
Economists argue that elevated search rates for minorities are not troubling
as long as minority and nonminority hit rates are comparable; elevated
minority search rates may reﬂect nothing more than an eﬃcient response to
diﬀerential rates of oﬀending. Cf., e.g., Jeﬀ Dominitz & John Knowles,
Crime Minimisation and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn from Police Search
Data?, 116 E CON . J. F368, F368-71 (2006) (noting that racial discrimination
can be inferred when higher search rates of a high crime–propensity group
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yield lower hit rates than searches of a low crime–propensity group); John
Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches:
Theory and Evidence, 109 J. P OL . E CON . 203, 205 (2001) (looking at the
success rate of police searches across races in order to determine whether
those searches are motivated by racial prejudice).
Just as violent victimization rates reﬂect a racial skew, there is ample
reason to believe that diﬀerential oﬀending is prevalent in New York.
Consider the 2012 NYPD crime data regarding the race of known suspects:
Murder and NonNegligent Homicide

Shootings

New York City
Population

Black

53.7%

78.2%

22.8%

Hispanic

34.8%

18.9%

28.8%

White

8.7%

2.4%

33.1%

Asian/

2.8%

0.5%

12.7%

Pac. Isl.

K ELLY , supra, at 1, 11, B-1.
There is also reason to believe that a strategy targeting criminal hot
spots would increase this racial skew. Although there is no reliable data on
the racial composition of criminal street gangs in New York, the U.S.
Department of Justice estimates that nationally, from 1996 through 2011,
blacks and Hispanics consistently accounted for more than 80% of total
gang membership. Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, N AT ’L G ANG C ENTER , http://
www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis/Demographics#anchorregm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2013). Similarly, there is evidence that the disproportionate rates at which minorities are incarcerated for drug oﬀenses reﬂect
the fact that they are disproportionately found at open-air drug markets and
other locations most easily targeted by police. See M ICHAEL T ONRY ,
M ALIGN N EGLECT—R ACE , C RIME, AND P UNISHMENT IN A MERICA
105-07 (1995); cf. R. Richard Banks, Beyond Proﬁling: Race, Policing, and the
Drug War, 56 S TAN . L. R EV . 571, 583 (2003) (noting that racial disparities
may result from targeting disproportionately minority neighborhoods where
it is easier to apprehend drug dealers). Thus, a stop-and-frisk strategy
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aimed at hot spots of gang and drug crime could well result in higher rates
of minority stops, even absent discrimination.
Judge Scheindlin made no ﬁndings as to diﬀerential oﬀending or other
potentially nondiscriminatory explanations for diﬀerential stop rates, except
to acknowledge that in 2011 and 2012, 83% of all known crime suspects and
90% of all violent crime suspects were black or Hispanic. Floyd, 2013 WL
4046209, at *20. She also made no ﬁnding of a racial skew in hit rates, as
measured by arrests and summonses. The plaintiﬀs’ expert even acknowledged that arrest and summons data for ���� to ���� reﬂect only “small
diﬀerences” in hit rates. Second Supplemental Report of Jeﬀrey Fagan,
Ph.D. at 34-35, Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209 (No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS)), available
at www.ccrjustice.org/files/FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf. This suggests
that police utilize equally reliable indicia of suspicion when stopping
minorities and nonminorities. Indeed, a RAND Corporation study of 2006
NYPD stop-and-frisk data concluded, after considering arrest rates and the
race of criminal suspects, that there was no evidence of discrimination
against blacks. See G REG R IDGEWAY , RAND C ORP., A NALYSIS OF
R ACIAL D ISPARITIES IN THE N EW Y ORK P OLICE D EPARTMENT ’S
S TOP, Q UESTION , AND F RISK P RACTICES 13-19 (2007).
Equal protection is oﬀended when “the decisionmaker . . . select[s] or
reaﬃrm[s] a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse eﬀects upon an identiﬁable group.” Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Pers.
Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Accordingly, when the underlying rate of oﬀending diﬀers by race, stop-and-frisk practices could well
involve no legally cognizable discrimination despite racially disparate stop
rates if the disparity is a consequence of targeting enforcement where oﬀending is greatest or most amenable to stop-and-frisk tactics. A strategy driven
by such law enforcement considerations does not run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment even if it produces racially skewed stop rates, as the Second
Circuit suggested in an earlier case involving an investigation focusing on
black suspects because they matched a victim’s description of the oﬀender.
See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333-34 (2d Cir. 2000).
Despite all this, Judge Scheindlin found a pattern of racial discrimination based on diﬀerences between stop rates by race and each race’s representation in the local population. See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *20
(concluding that “[i]f the police are stopping people in a race-neutral way,
then the racial composition of innocent people stopped should more or less
mirror the racial composition of the areas where they are stopped,” since
“nearly ��% of the people stopped are released without the oﬃcer ﬁnding
any basis for a summons or arrest”). This was a serious error. An eﬀective
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stop-and-frisk strategy should not target the population at large, but rather,
should be focused where it can do the most good, such as criminogenic hot
spots. In light of the evidence of diﬀerential oﬀending in New York, there
is little reason to believe that the racial makeup of those who frequent high
crime locations will mirror that of the population at large. Even Judge
Scheindlin acknowledged that “[c]rime suspect data may serve as a reliable
proxy for the pool of criminals exhibiting suspicious behavior.” Id. at *21. The
Fourth Amendment, in turn, permits—in fact it eﬀectively compels—a strategy
that targets this pool, rather than the population at large. The fact that most of
those who are stopped are released therefore does not reﬂect discrimination,
but only the reality that the Fourth Amendment permits the police to act on
the basis of evidence of criminality that stops well short of a preponderance.
5. Although Judge Scheindlin invoked “the human toll of unconstitutional stops,” id. at *2, her one-eyed appraisal neglects another human toll.
The contours of Judge Scheindlin’s injunction have yet to take shape since
she appointed a monitor to “develop, in consultation with the parties, an
initial set of reforms to the NYPD’s policies, training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline regarding stop and frisk.” Floyd v. City of New York,
No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046217, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013).
Indeed, we will likely never know the scope of the remedy that Judge
Scheindlin had in mind since the Second Circuit has ordered her removal
from the litigation. See In re Reassignment of Cases: Floyd v. City of New
York, No. 13-3088, 2013 WL 5998139, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2013). Yet, the
history of judicial eﬀorts to overhaul policing is not encouraging. Most who
have studied the U.S. Department of Justice’s attempts, in “pattern or
practice” cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006), to use judicial decrees to
reform policing have found the results disappointing. See, e.g., Rachel A.
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 S TAN .
L. R EV . 1, 52-57 (2009); Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and
Police Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 A LA . L. R EV . 351, 371-76 (2011). If Judge Scheindlin’s remedy is
sustained on appeal, however, and her successor judge and the appointed
monitor put suﬃcient pressure on the NYPD, they probably can drive stop
rates down. Police oﬃcers internalize few—if any—of the costs or beneﬁts
of search and seizure. Stop-and-frisk is a dangerous, unpleasant business. It
should not take much to reach a tipping point. If oﬃcers face a credible
threat of sanctions if someone complains to a monitor, they will likely stop
bothering with stop-and-frisk. After all, there is one foolproof way to drive
down the rate of unjustiﬁed stops—oﬃcers can stay in the doughnut shops.
But, once it becomes apparent that a federal judge–run NYPD will no
longer intervene forcefully and proactively on the streets, the dynamics for
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a return to vintage crime rates will be in place. When crime spiked in 1990,
New Yorkers at least had the option of demanding more aggressive law
enforcement from politically accountable oﬃcials. Federal judges, however,
enjoy life tenure, and according to Judge Scheindlin, they must resolutely
refuse to consider the eﬀectiveness of policing tactics. Perhaps Judge
Scheindlin thinks of federal judges as judicial Goldilocks who can design a
system that oﬀers just enough—but not too much—deterrence. This is the
stuﬀ of which judicial hubris is made. But, given Judge Scheindlin’s announced disinterest in the eﬃcacy of police tactics, one has little reason to
hope that she would care if her decrees produced more crime in New York.
Judge Scheindlin wrote, “Fostering trust and conﬁdence between the
police and the community would be an improvement for everyone.” Floyd,
2013 WL 4046209, at *2. Yet the available data suggest that what drives the
opinions of local police is the local crime rate, not race. See Rosenthal, supra,
at 354-55. People who do not feel safe are not likely to repose their trust
and conﬁdence in the police. Even worse, as we have seen, the human toll
of violent crime in New York falls disproportionately on minorities.
Consider a New York in which wealthy white neighborhoods enjoy low
crime rates, while, in disadvantaged minority neighborhoods, police keep
stop rates low to please a federal judge but fail to intervene eﬀectively to
disrupt the dynamics that drive gang- and drug-related crime. That may
satisfy Judge Scheindlin, who cannot be bothered with questions of police
eﬃcacy. To my eye, however, a New York like that fails to oﬀer, in the
most literal sense, equal protection of the law.
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C LOSING S TATEMENT	
  
Going Beyond “Trust Us” Policing

D AVID R UDOVSKY
As John Adams famously stated in the Boston Massacre Trial, “facts are
stubborn things.” Professor Rosenthal accuses Judge Scheindlin of ignoring
relevant facts and viewing stop-and-frisk in a “relentlessly monocular
fashion,” but he fails to acknowledge the substantial array of facts that
undermine his arguments.
Professor Rosenthal asserts that Judge Scheindlin erred in refusing to
consider evidence of the “eﬃcacy” of the stop-and-frisk program in New
York City. He asks: how can a court ﬁnd a policing program unreasonable if
it “seems to work”? Of course, this position requires both proof of the
eﬀectiveness of stop-and-frisk practices in controlling crime and support for
the legal proposition that conduct otherwise violative of the Constitution
can nevertheless be considered legitimate because of its impact on crime.
Indeed, the evidentiary bar on eﬃcacy is high, since citizens are being asked
to sacriﬁce their constitutional rights in return for guarantees of safety.
On the factual question, Professor Rosenthal argues that because there
was a steep decline in crime in New York City during the period in which
stop-and-frisk became a prominent part of policing, we can assume that
there must be some causal link. To the contrary, while there is agreement
that New York City policing played a signiﬁcant role in the crime decline,
there is agreement as well that there are “myriad” factors at work and that it
is extremely diﬃcult to draw causal lines, as Professor Rosenthal concedes.
Moreover, he conﬂates stop-and-frisk policing with a number of overlapping police initiatives, including CompStat analysis of crime patterns,
community policing to engage citizens, and “hot spot” policing to identify
salient crime areas. The “proof” cited for the proposition that stop-and-frisk
was the critical component in New York’s crime drop is surprisingly thin.
Professor Rosenthal relies on a study by Franklin E. Zimring, but Zimring
is careful to state that there is no speciﬁc evidence that stop-and-frisk
played a signiﬁcant role in the decline in crime. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,
T HE C ITY THAT B ECAME S AFE : N EW Y ORK ’S L ESSONS FOR U RBAN
C RIME AND ITS C ONTROL 148-50 (2012). The other cited study also ﬁnds
the evidence to be inconclusive, as a result of “the lack of adequate data on
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possible confounding causes.” See David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep &
Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the New
York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police Strength? The Case of
Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, JUST. Q. 16 n.11
(Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418825.2012.754920
#preview. Further, Weisburd, Telep, and Lawton explicitly state that they
cannot determine “whether the increase in [stop, question and frisk] tactics
has come at the expense of other innovative policing strategies.” Id. at 18.
Professor Rosenthal fails to mention other studies that ﬁnd little or no
causal relationship between stop-and-frisk and crime reduction in New York
City. See, e.g., Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police
Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010,
J UST. Q. 10 (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.
1080/07418825.2012.712152#.Uo4HNKHzb-s#preview. Unfortunately, the
relationship between crime, stops, other law enforcement practices, and
related social and economic factors is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to measure.
Cf. David F. Greenberg, Studying New York City’s Crime Decline: Methodological Issues, JUST. Q. 2-3 ( Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/07418825.2012.752026#.Uo4IYqHzb-s#preview. Further, Professor Rosenthal does not address the large decline in crime—not as steep as in
New York but still substantial—that was achieved in other cities without
massive use of stop-and-frisk. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why
Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do
Not, 18 J. E CON . P ERSP. 163, 168 tbl.4, 172-73 (2004).
Professor Rosenthal also fails to discuss contrary factual evidence from
the New York City experience itself. Crime fell by approximately 10% in
New York City from 1992 to 1993, two years prior to the onset of NYPD
stop-and-frisk policing tactics, and the huge increase in stops from 2002
through 2011 followed several years of a steep decline in New York crime.
See Jeﬀrey Fagan & John MacDonald, Policing, Crime and Legitimacy in New
York and Los Angeles: The Social and Political Contexts of Two Historic Crime
Declines, in N EW Y ORK AND L OS A NGELES: T HE U NCERTAIN F UTURE
219, 240-42, 242 tbl.8.1 (David Halle & Andrew A. Beveridge eds., 2013);
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. C HI. L. R EV 271, 320
app. ﬁg.� (����).
It is remarkable as well that the Rebuttal ignores the most pertinent
contemporary data: during the ﬁrst half of ����, there was a huge decrease
(over 50%) in the number of stops and a continuing sharp decrease (almost
25%) in the number of homicides, compared to the same period last year.
R AYMOND W. K ELLY , N.Y.C. P OLICE D EP’T , N EW Y ORK C ITY
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POLICE DEPARTMENT STOP QUESTION AND FRISK ACTIVITY 4 (2012),
available at http://www.nyclu.org/ﬁles/����_�nd_Qtr.pdf; Joseph Goldstein,
City Homicides Drop Sharply, Again; Police Cite New Antigang Strategy, N.Y.
T IMES ( June 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/29/nyregion/cityhomicides-drop-sharply-again-police-cite-new-antigang-strategy.html?_r=1&;
Joseph Goldstein, Police Stop-and-Frisk Encounters Plunged in Second Quarter
of 2013, Data Show, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/08/28/nyregion/data-show-steep-decline-in-police-stops-in-new-yorkcity-this-year.html?_r=0. And the decline in stops was even greater during
the third quarter of 2013—the NYPD made just 21,000 stops, or 80% fewer
than during the same time period in 2012. Associated Press, NYC Police
Stop-and-Frisk Numbers Down Sharply, N.Y. T IMES (Nov. 18, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/aponline/2013/11/18/us/ap-us-stop-and-frisk.html?ref=stop
andfrisk&_r=1&. To be clear, I do not argue that these data prove that stopand-frisk plays no role in the control of violent crime, but it is powerful
evidence that the NYPD’s claims on this issue are highly exaggerated.
Professor Rosenthal argues that the hit rate for stops in New York “does
not look so bad.” On this normative issue, I strongly disagree. First, the
supposed 12% hit rate is itself an overstatement. Recent studies have shown
that nearly 50% of all arrests and summons that result from stop-and-frisk
activity are dismissed very early in the prosecution phase. See E RIC T.
S CHNEIDERMAN , N.Y. S TATE O FFICE OF THE A TTORNEY G EN ., A
R EPORT ON A RRESTS A RISING FROM THE N EW Y ORK C ITY P OLICE
D EPARTMENT ’S S TOP-AND -F RISK P RACTICES 3, 10 ﬁg.7 (2013), available
at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_
NOV_2013.pdf (noting that, between 2009 and 2012, 15.7% of arrests were
not prosecuted, 10.5% were dismissed, and 21.3% were “adjourn[ed] in
contemplation of dismissal”). Moreover, a number of these arrests and
summonses are the result of post-stop information or police–citizen conﬂict
during the course of a stop, which proves nothing about the legitimacy of
the stop in the ﬁrst place.
Even more important is the data on frisks. New York police frisk suspects they have stopped about 50% of the time (I suspect that frisks are
underreported), yet in only 1.5% of these frisks do they uncover a weapon.
See Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). Considering that the Supreme Court has
ruled that a frisk requires reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “armed
and dangerous,” one can only wonder why the police have been wrong
98.5% of the time. Data from other jurisdictions disclose similar very low
hit rates for weapons. In Philadelphia, for example, the hit rate for weapons
was �.�% during the ﬁrst half of ����. See Plaintiﬀs’ Third Report to Court
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and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices at 6-7, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011), available at
http://www.aclupa.org/download_ﬁle/view_inline/����/��� (noting that ���
frisks led to the recovery of only three guns). As I pointed out in my
Opening Statement, either the Terry standard has become so open-ended as
to allow frisks without cause or the police are asserting grounds for a frisk
where none exist.
There is also good reason to believe that the UF-250 checkbox form
masks many improper stops. In 1999, the New York Attorney General
reviewed instances where police were required to record narratives explaining the reason for their stops. The Attorney General found that based on
the information provided in the UF-250 forms, 15.4% of stops were not
justiﬁed and ��.�% were ambiguous—that is, the forms did not provide
suﬃcient information to allow a reader to determine whether the facts
articulated amounted to “reasonable suspicion.” See C IVIL R IGHTS B UREAU , N.Y. S TATE O FFICE OF THE A TTORNEY G EN ., T HE N EW Y ORK
C ITY P OLICE D EPARTMENT ’S “S TOP AND F RISK ” P RACTICES: A
R EPORT TO THE P EOPLE OF THE S TATE OF N EW Y ORK FROM THE
O FFICE OF THE A TTORNEY G ENERAL 160-64 (1999), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/ﬁles/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_
frsk.pdf. Similar results have been found in the Bailey litigation and in an
academic study cited by Professor Rosenthal. See Plaintiﬀs’ Third Report to
Court, supra, at 4-5; Andrew Gelman, Jeﬀrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An
Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Policy in the
Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. A M . S TAT . A SS’N 813, 815-16 (2007).
Finally, it must be remembered that the Floyd ruling on the Fourth
Amendment claim was also based on the testimony of individuals who had
been subjected to illegal stops. Professor Rosenthal asserts that such
testimony was “cherry-picked,” but corroborating evidence demonstrates
that the reality of stop-and-frisk in New York City includes a pattern of
oﬃcer conduct that is needlessly humiliating and intimidating. See, e.g.,
Wendy Ruderman, For Women in Street Stops, Deeper Humiliation, N.Y.
T IMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/nyregion/forwomen-in-street-stops-deeper-humiliation.html.
As a legal matter, Professor Rosenthal assures us that nothing permits
“unconstrained” stops, but he provides no standards by which to distinguish
between proper stops and those that are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The argument that eﬃcacy trumps standard Fourth Amendment
restraints runs counter to over 200 years of constitutional history. We
should not forget the role that the “writs of assistance” played in the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment. These writs were used by the British
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Government to detect and suppress widespread violations by the colonists
of laws mandating import duties and taxes. Notwithstanding the fact that
the writs were eﬀective, those who drafted the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures intended to prohibit this
type of random search. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-27
(����). The fact that crime can be more eﬀectively suppressed if the police
are freed of all restraints on their power to search is quite beside the
constitutional point. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment was adopted to ensure
that the “liberty of every man [is not placed] in the hands of every petty
oﬃcer.” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965) (quoting Boyd, 116
U.S. at 625). In other cases in which the challenged police practices were
similarly eﬀective, the Supreme Court has rejected the “eﬃcacy” argument
where the searches were not justiﬁed under the Fourth Amendment. See,
e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34-35, 47-48 (2000)
(holding a highway drug checkpoint program unconstitutional despite a
4.74% drug-related arrest rate and an 8.96% overall arrest rate).
Professor Rosenthal’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis is equally questionable. Citing the high rates of both victimization and oﬀending by
African Americans with respect to violent crimes, he asserts that a program
that reduces the level of crime must be legitimate even if it disproportionately aﬀects African Americans. There are a number of ﬂaws in this approach. First, it is simply not permissible to target all members of a racial
minority for the acts of very few of that group. Judge Scheindlin was careful
to acknowledge that an oﬃcer can legitimately consider race when stopping
a person who ﬁts a speciﬁc suspect description (a category that constituted
the basis for a mere 13% of the stops in New York City), Floyd, 2013 WL
4046209, at *20, but that is a far cry from the City’s argument that group
actuarial-based suspicion is permissible. To the contrary, stopping individuals based on their race because other members of that race are responsible
for higher rates of crime is precisely the kind of discrimination barred by
the Equal Protection Clause. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston,
Racial Proﬁling Under Attack, 102 C OLUM . L. R EV . 1413, 1415 (2002) (“The
essence of racial proﬁling is a global judgment that the targeted group . . . is
more prone to commit crime . . . .”). Further, the Second Circuit has
speciﬁcally warned that “a description of race and gender alone will rarely
provide reasonable suspicion justifying a police search or seizure.” Brown v.
City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000).
Second, Judge Scheindlin credited benchmarks that considered local
oﬀending patterns. See Floyd, ���� WL �������, at *�. Plaintiﬀs’ expert
considered the total volume of crimes in small, racially homogeneous areas
and employed regression analysis to determine if factors other than race
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could explain the large racial disparities in New York City stops. See Second
Supplemental Report of Jeﬀrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 2-5, Floyd, 2013 WL
4046209 (No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS)), available at www.ccrjustice.org/
ﬁles/FaganSecondSupplementalReport.pdf. Professor Rosenthal complains
that these benchmarks do not take into consideration “diﬀerential oﬀending” patterns by race and asserts that since the stop rates approximate the
reports of suspect race data for serious crimes in New York City, the
program is free of racial bias.
There are several problems with this argument. There is far from complete data as to the race of those involved in “reported” crimes; the great
majority of stops (85%) between 2004 and 2009 were not based on suspicion
of violent crime, Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *46 n.424; and only 13% of
stops were based on a determination that the suspect ﬁt a speciﬁc physical
description. Id. at *20. Thus, the notion that stop-and-frisk practices are
carefully calibrated to respond to violent crime (or even crimes of possession of weapons) is refuted by the factual record.
Along the same lines, Professor Rosenthal cites studies by economists
who suggest that racially disparate stop rates of motorists are justiﬁed if
they eventually lead to an “equilibrium” in oﬀending rates (on the highways, this usually means drug oﬀenses). See, e.g., John Knowles, Nicola
Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and
Evidence, 109 J. P OL . E CON . 203 (2001). Putting aside substantial criticisms
of these studies’ methodologies, see e.g., B ERNARD E. H ARCOURT ,
A GAINST P REDICTION : P ROFILING , P OLICING , AND P UNISHING IN
AN A CTUARIAL A GE 122-39 (2007); Steven N. Durlauf, Assessing Racial
Proﬁling, 116 E CON . J. F402, F406-07 (2006), and the fact that highway
stops involve a universe of drivers, almost all of whom are legitimate
“suspects” due to traﬃc infractions, it is impermissible to treat individuals
of one racial group diﬀerently on the basis of higher oﬀending levels of that
group. Would the advocates of this approach to crime control argue that if
one racial group is responsible for twice as many violent crimes as another,
the state could enact sentencing laws that double that group’s sentences, on
the theory that the increased deterrence will eventually lead to an equilibrium in oﬀending?
Third, Professor Rosenthal’s defense of highly disproportionate rates of
prosecution and incarceration of whites and African Americans for drug
oﬀenses is highly problematic. The national data demonstrate that whites
use, possess, and sell drugs at rates approximately equal to minorities, but
the arrest and incarceration rates for drug oﬀenses are overwhelmingly
disparate by race. See M ARC M AUER , T HE S ENTENCING P ROJECT ,
R ACIAL D ISPARITIES IN THE C RIMINAL JUSTICE S YSTEM : P REPARED

4-Part Debate Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/10/2013 9:30 AM

The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New York City

143

H OUSE JUDICIARY S UBCOMMITTEE ON C RIME, T ERRORH OMELAND S ECURITY 3-4 (2009), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/hearings/pdf/mauer091029.pdf (testifying that in 2005, African
Americans represented 14% of current drug users, 33.9% of persons arrested
for a drug oﬀense, and ��% of persons sentenced to prison for a drug
oﬀense); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Eﬀects of Drug
and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, in 37 C RIME AND JUSTICE : A
R EVIEW OF R ESEARCH 1, 23-��, �� ﬁg.�, �� tbl.� (Michael Tonry ed.,
2008). And in New York City, the racial disparities in marijuana arrests are
truly astounding. See Harry Levine, The Scandal of Racist Marijuana Arrests—and What to Do About It, N ATION (Oct. 30, 2013), http://
www.thenation.com/article/176915/scandal-racist-marijuana-arrests-and-whatdo-about-it#. African Americans are at great risk in the war on drugs;
whites, whether on college campuses, or in middle-class communities—and
particularly with respect to marijuana—get a free ride. Is this racial discrimination? Not according to Professor Rosenthal who views this merely as an
artifact of policing “easy targets.”
Having failed to come to grips with the facts and the law on both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment issues, Professor Rosenthal ends with
the usual dire warning: that the Floyd remedial order will lead to “depolicing.” Fortunately, there is no support for the argument that police will
retreat to the nearest doughnut shop for fear of complaints or lawsuits, or to
avoid what they view as unfair limits on their power. As noted above,
before Judge Scheindlin’s ruling, the NYPD substantially decreased its
number of stops, yet crime rates continued to fall. Rather than de-policing,
the NYPD altered its practices in the summer of 2013, shifting from casting
a broad net of low-yield, unproductive stops to a tactical focus on youth
gangs and crimes in and around public housing projects. See Joseph Goldstein
& J. David Goodman, Frisking Tactic Yields to a Focus on Youth Gangs, N.Y.
T IMES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/nyregion/
frisking-tactic-yields-to-a-focus-on-youth-gangs.html?_r=0.
In other jurisdictions where courts have intervened, there is no evidence
of such “de-policing.” See C HRISTOPHER S TONE ET AL., P OLICING L OS
A NGELES U NDER A C ONSENT D ECREE: T HE D YNAMICS OF C HANGE
AT THE LAPD 22 (2009), available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/
pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf. The experience in Los Angeles shows
that a consent decree and new community policing models can lead to
better police practices, higher levels of community cooperation with the
police, and lower rates of crime.
A ﬁnal point. Defenders of New York’s stop-and-frisk practices assert
that the decrease in crime has largely beneﬁtted the African American
FOR THE
ISM , AND
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community, which suﬀers most of the violent crime and, therefore, whatever
the indignities suﬀered, overall the practices provide a distinct advantage to
African Americans. Indeed, some suggest that those who do not live in high
crime areas should refrain from criticizing any policing methods that drive
down crime in those neighborhoods. But it appears quite clear—from the
recent mayoral election and from widespread criticism of current policing in
New York City—that many African Americans believe the past practices to
be unnecessarily harsh, humiliating, and oppressive.
The Floyd decisions on liability and remedial measures were proper and
necessary. Court intervention that is properly calibrated to deal with proven
constitutional violations can both remediate the violations and leave police
with the powers necessary for eﬀective crime control.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
What, Me Worry?
LAWRENCE R OSENTHAL
Professor Rudovsky assures us that a hostile judicial takeover of the
NYPD is no cause for concern—it will eliminate the supposed evils of stopand-frisk without unintended consequences. For those of us who can aﬀord
to live in safe, stable communities where crime rates remain relatively
constant regardless of the policing tactics used, this kind of talk is cheap.
For the less fortunate among us, there is more cause for concern.
1. Professor Rudovsky doubts any relationship between stop-and-frisk
and crime reduction. His argument, however, encounters a few inconvenient facts, even as he warns us that “‘facts are stubborn things.’”
Professor Rudovsky tells us that crime began declining in New York
from 1992 to 1993, before the advent of stop-and-frisk, but he overlooks the
fact that, according to the Attorney General’s report that he himself cites,
the NYPD began focusing on aggressive patrol and combating low-level
disorder as early as 1990, under Police Commissioner Lee Brown. See C IVIL
R IGHTS B UREAU , N.Y. S TATE O FFICE OF THE A TTORNEY G EN ., T HE
N EW Y ORK C ITY P OLICE D EPARTMENT ’S “S TOP AND F RISK ” P RACTICES : A R EPORT TO THE P EOPLE OF THE S TATE OF N EW Y ORK
FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 47-52 (1999), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_rights/stp_frsk
.pdf. In fact, an article coauthored by the plaintiﬀs’ expert in Floyd v. City of
New York acknowledged that the crime decline in New York bore a close
temporal relationship to the adoption of more aggressive policing tactics.
See Jeﬀrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & June Kim, Declining Homicide in
New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY
1277, 1313-16 (1998). The same expert also coauthored a study demonstrating
the eﬃcacy of aggressive patrols undertaken near public housing projects.
See Jeﬀrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Jan Holland, The Paradox of the Drug
Elimination Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 G EO . J. ON P OVERTY L. & P OL ’ Y 415, 442-53 (2006). Even more recently, he coauthored
an essay, cited by Professor Rudovsky on another point, that concluded that
the NYPD’s COMPSTAT program—which uses statistical analysis “to
drive the allocation of police resources to crime ‘hot spots’”—was clearly
linked to crime reduction: “If we were to focus on only examining the eﬀect
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of the COMPSTAT program in New York City that started in 1994, we
would see a clear inﬂuence of this program in reducing robberies and
homicides.” Jeﬀrey Fagan & John MacDonald, Policing, Crime and Legitimacy
in New York and Los Angeles: The Social and Political Contexts of Two Historic
Crime Declines, in N EW Y ORK AND L OS A NGELES: T HE U NCERTAIN
F UTURE 219, 240 (David Halle & Andrew A. Beveridge eds., 2013).
Professor Rudovsky does not quarrel with the eﬃcacy of COMPSTAT
or “hot spot” policing, yet he seems to believe that one can disaggregate the
eﬀects of these policing strategies from those of stop-and-frisk. They are,
however, inextricably intertwined. Studying statistical data alone does not
drive down crime, nor does telling oﬃcers to visit hot spots. Without stopand-frisk, these other tactics cannot alter the calculus of potential oﬀenders
on the streetscape. Indeed, as I note in my Rebuttal, a wide variety of
studies throughout the nation have demonstrated the eﬃcacy of aggressive
patrol targeted at hot spots. And, if stop-and-frisk succeeds in driving down
crime, it gets harder to brand it constitutionally unreasonable. To be sure,
Professor Rudovsky is correct that evidence of the eﬃcacy of a policing
tactic cannot “trump[] standard Fourth Amendment restraints,” but it is
equally settled that the Fourth Amendment requires consideration of both
the privacy and law-enforcement interests at stake in order to assess that
tactic’s reasonableness in the constitutional sense. To ignore eﬃcacy is to
ignore at least half of the calculus. Thus, to claim that “citizens are being
asked to sacriﬁce their constitutional rights in return for guarantees of
safety” is to assume an unwarranted conclusion about the constitutionality
of a practice that may well be predicated on reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, as demonstrated by its ability to drive down crime.
Professor Rudovsky argues that cities other than New York also experienced crime declines, but he pays little attention to Franklin Zimring’s
exhaustive demonstration that no major city experienced a crime decline as
steep and long lasting as that of New York. See F RANKLIN E. Z IMRING ,
T HE C ITY THAT B ECAME S AFE : N EW Y ORK ’S L ESSONS FOR U RBAN
C RIME AND ITS C ONTROL 3-27 (2012). He also cites a study showing
little correlation between stop-and-frisk and crime decline in New York
from 2003 to 2010, see Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of
Police Stops on Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 20032010, J UST. Q. 10 (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/
10.1080/07418825.2012.712152#.Uo4HNKHzb-s#preview, but ignores the
point made in my Rebuttal—in the last decade, it may well be that stop-and-frisk
passed the point of diminishing returns, which would explain the lack of
correlation between stop-and-frisk and crime decline during that period.
Indeed, the authors of the study that Professor Rudovsky cites acknowledge
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both that their conclusion is “[i]n contrast with prior research,” and that the
total rate of documented stops tripled between 2003 and 2010. See id. at 2-3.
Having observed the success of stop-and-frisk, the NYPD may have
expanded its use beyond the criminogenic hot spots where it is most likely
to pay dividends. Overuse of stop-and-frisk during the past decade likely
explains as well the NYPD’s ability to keep crime rates low over the past
eighteen months even as it has reduced its reliance on stop-and-frisk. An
unnecessary increase in stop rates since 2003, however, supplies an argument for returning stop-and-frisk to its original focus on hot spots—not for
the complete overhaul ordered by Judge Scheindlin, with stated indiﬀerence
to questions of eﬃcacy.
When it comes to the eﬃcacy of stop-and-frisk, it is striking that Professor Rudovsky oﬀers no alternate explanation for New York’s crime
decline. As I note in my Rebuttal, no other explanation presents itself. It is
true, as Professor Rudovsky notes, that “the relationship between crime,
stops, other law enforcement practices, and related social and economic
factors is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to measure.” But, if there is even a
serious case to be made for the eﬃcacy of stop-and-frisk, surely we should
hesitate before abandoning a tactic that may well save lives, mostly those from
impoverished and disproportionately minority communities. Abandoning a
tactic that may well work, after all, amounts to a gamble with people’s lives.
2. Like Judge Scheindlin, Professor Rudovsky speculates that the 12% hit
rate reﬂected in the New York stop-and-frisk data may be overstated. Yet,
the evidence he oﬀers makes a thin gruel. That many charges arising from
stops and frisks are dismissed at some point prior to trial, for example, is
not evidence that these charges were unsupported by probable cause; the
standard for conviction, of course, is higher than the standard required to
justify a stop or an ensuing arrest. Beyond that, prosecutors may abandon a
case for a myriad of reasons unrelated to the propriety of the arrest or stop
that may have preceded it. Professor Rudovsky also disregards the rather
low rate (�%) of unjustiﬁed stops calculated by the plaintiﬀs’ expert, see
Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), and instead cites the higher rates calculated by
the New York Attorney General in 1999 based on the UF-250 forms then in
use. See C IVIL R IGHTS B UREAU , supra, at 160-64. That iteration of the
form, however, was intended solely as an investigative tool; it was neither
intended nor used to document the justiﬁcation for stops. See James J. Fyfe,
Reaction Essay, Stops, Frisks, Searches, and the Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY &
P UB. P OL ’Y 379, 392-94 (2004). The 1999 Attorney General’s report, in
short, proves little. And, as I note in my Rebuttal, even the current form
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has dramatic limitations as a tool for identifying unjustiﬁed stops. About
this, Professor Rudovsky is silent.
Professor Rudovsky highlights Judge Scheindlin’s ﬁnding that only
about 1.5% of frisks recover weapons, though this amounts to a recovery of
some 33,882 weapons. See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *13 & n.110. One
wonders exactly how high the probability that a suspect is armed and
dangerous needs to be before Professor Rudovsky would permit a frisk. It is
hard to brand an oﬃcer unreasonable if, when stopping a suspect reasonably
suspected of criminal activity while in a statistical hot spot of violent crime,
that oﬃcer does not require much in the way of additional predication
before performing a protective frisk. After all, the oﬃcer’s life is at risk. For
just this reason, if judicial intervention places too much pressure on oﬃcers
to refrain from frisks, especially in hot spots of violent crime, the likely
result is that oﬃcers will simply abstain from stopping suspects altogether.
As Chief Justice Warren cautioned, excessive judicial eﬀorts to restrict
oﬃcers’ ability to protect themselves “may exact a high toll in human injury
and frustration of eﬀorts to prevent crime.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15
(1968). If we are to take seriously the notion that the Fourth Amendment’s
command of reasonableness requires that we balance privacy and lawenforcement interests, surely we should regard an oﬃcer’s ability to err on
the side of caution when safety is at risk as an interest of the highest order.
3. Professor Rudovsky and I can agree that “stopping individuals based
on their race because other members of that race are responsible for higher
rates of crime is precisely the kind of discrimination barred by the Equal
Protection Clause.” But, the small diﬀerences in hit rates in New York for
stops and frisks of members of diﬀerent racial groups suggest that persons
are not being stopped because of their race, but based on equally valid
indicia of reasonable suspicion. Beyond that, Professor Rudovsky never
explains why, in light of the ample evidence of diﬀerential oﬀending by race
in New York—evidence with which neither the plaintiﬀs nor Judge
Scheindlin quarreled—we should expect stop rates to be representative of
the racial composition of the population at large, rather than that of the
pool of oﬀenders.
Especially for a stop-and-frisk strategy focused at hot spots of violent
crime, we should expect stop rates to reﬂect the racial composition of the
subset of those likely to frequent such hot spots, not that of the general
population. Similarly, even if whites and blacks use drugs at roughly equal
rates, a stop-and-frisk strategy focusing on the kind of street-level distribution most vulnerable to that tactic should be expected to reﬂect the racial
composition of the pool of street-level traﬃckers, not the population of
drug users at large. If we focus on the subset of the population most likely
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to frequent the statistical hot spots of violent crime on which stop-and-frisk
focuses, then the racial composition of the pool of oﬀenders in New York
would seem to be a far better proxy than the general population. Judge
Scheindlin even acknowledged that “[c]rime suspect data may serve as a
reliable proxy for the pool of criminals exhibiting suspicious behavior.”
Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *21. This is precisely why crime suspect data
oﬀers a far better proxy for those most likely to be subjected to stop-andfrisk based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in a nondiscriminatory regime than a benchmark based on the racial composition of the
population at large. Cf. United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 862-64 (2002)
(per curiam) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a capital prosecution based on statistics showing that the United States charges blacks with
death-eligible oﬀenses at higher rates than whites and enters into plea
bargains more frequently with whites “because respondent failed to submit
relevant evidence that similarly situated persons were treated diﬀerently”).
Oﬃcers on patrol are looking for oﬀenders, not the innocent.
It seems that Judge Scheindlin and Professor Rudovsky are distressed
that the NYPD is not stopping enough innocent whites. Yet, if the NYPD
stopped more innocent whites, the hit rate for stops of whites would fall
below that for minority stops, providing potential white plaintiﬀs powerful
support for their own equal protection claim that the NYPD discriminated
against them on the basis of race. Thus, given the population benchmark
employed by Judge Scheindlin and endorsed by Professor Rudovsky, the
NYPD would violate the Equal Protection Clause no matter what it did.
These are the inescapable conundrums born of a failure to take account of the
undisputed evidence of diﬀerential rates of oﬀending by race in New York City.
4. Professor Rudovsky dismisses fears that placing judicial pressure on
stop-and-frisk will overdeter police. Yet, as even critics of urban policing
acknowledge, there is substantial evidence that police respond to criticism
of perceived racial proﬁling in just this fashion. See, e.g., Frank Rudy
Cooper, Understanding “Depolicing”: Symbiosis Theory and Critical Culture
Theory, 71 UMKC L. REV. 355, 357-64 (2002). Economists have modeled and
studied the phenomenon, and caution that proper training and supervision of
oﬃcers are critical to ensuring that police reforms aimed at reducing
perceived misconduct do not produce higher rates of unlawful behavior. See,
e.g., Paul Heaton, Understanding the Eﬀects of Antiproﬁling Policies, 53 J.L. &
E CON . 29, 57-58 (2010).
Under other circumstances, the risk of overdeterrence might be regarded
as acceptable since politically accountable oﬃcials have potent incentives to
ensure that police ﬁght crime eﬀectively. Now that crime in New York is
low, the focus seems to have turned to police reform, but if crime were to
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rise, the ordinary processes of political accountability would cause the
pendulum to swing. But, when an unaccountable, life-tenured federal judge
seizes control of a police department, declares her disinterest in the eﬃcacy
of police tactics, and then appoints a monitor with a mission to reduce the
prevalence of stop-and-frisk, one has to worry how the police will react, and
whether the ordinary political checks and balances will remain eﬀective if
crime begins to spiral. At least, I worry. Professor Rudovsky, not so much.
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